Central Banking · Lecture 3
03
From expected actions to global repricing.
Central Banking  ·  Lecture Three
Worcester College

Monetary Policy Surprises.

Expected actions, target news, path news, global spillovers, and synchronized impact prices.
Fatih Kansoy
Central Banking · Lecture 3
Worcester College

The Lecture Moves from Actions to News

Identification begins by replacing the observed action with the expectation revision

01
Define the surprise
Policy news is the revision between what markets expected before an announcement and what they price after it.
After expectation − before expectation
02
Isolate current-target news
Kuttner uses federal funds futures to separate anticipated target actions from unexpected actions.
Current-target surprise
03
Recover future-path news
Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson show that one factor is not enough: statements also reshape expected future rates.
Target + path factors
The key design choice is the regressor: policy news, not the raw policy action.

Then Take the Surprise Across Borders

The object becomes richer, but it remains policy news

04
Measure global spillovers
Hausman and Wongswan trace U.S. target and path news into foreign equities, currencies, and interest rates.
Foreign-asset response
05
Align the traded asset and window
Kansoy uses U.S.-listed country ETFs to observe impact repricing while foreign cash markets are closed.
Same-window impact
06
Compare the estimands
Each paper answers a richer measurement question without abandoning the surprise principle.
Identification ladder
Target, path, foreign assets, and closed-market impact are successive refinements of one event-study logic.
Central Banking · Lecture 3
I
Why surprises, not changes?
Part I
Introduction

Policy News Revises Expectations.

The action matters only relative to what the market had already priced.
Information sets before and after
Target versus path news
High-frequency identification

The Policy Object Can Be a Target or a Path

Markets price an entire expected policy sequence—not only today’s rate

\[ g_t \equiv g\!\left(r_t^{*},r_{t+1}^{*},\ldots,r_{t+H}^{*}\right) \]
Policy state
\(r_{t+h}^{*}\)
The central-bank target at date \(t+h\).
Horizon
\(H\)
How far ahead expected policy matters for the asset payoff.
Chosen object
\(g_t\)
Current target, future path, or an average expected policy rate.
The measured surprise depends on which policy object the asset is pricing.

Policy News Is a Filtration Revision

Compare the conditional expectation immediately after the announcement with the one immediately before

\[ S_t(g)\equiv \mathbb E[g_t\mid\mathcal F_{t^+}] - \mathbb E[g_t\mid\mathcal F_{t^-}] \]
Before
priced expectation
\(\mathcal F_{t^-}\)
Announcement
new information arrives
After
revised expectation
\(\mathcal F_{t^+}\)
An action is news only to the extent that it changes the conditional expectation.

Policy News Reorders Expectations

The new information changes the ordering of expected policy states and reshapes the path

Expectation cards before a central-bank announcement are reordered after a narrow information pulse, while the expected rate path changes
Before → announcement → after; the path revision remains direction-neutral.
State revision
The market already held a distribution
The announcement does not create expectations from nothing. It changes the probabilities and ordering of states that were already priced.
Event-study object
After minus before
Measure the same asset and the same policy object on both sides of the information arrival.
Interpretation: policy news is the revision, not the level of the post-announcement path.

The Surprise Is Unpredictable Before the Event

Unpredictable does not mean economically small—it means orthogonal to pre-announcement information

\[ \mathbb E\!\left[S_t(g)\mid\mathcal F_{t^-}\right]=0 \]
Definition
If the market could predict the revision using \(\mathcal F_{t^-}\), that predictable component should already be in the pre-announcement price.
Positive surprise
More hawkish than priced
For the chosen object \(g_t\), the post-announcement conditional expectation is higher.
Zero surprise
Confirmation
The announcement delivers the expectation already embedded in the price.
The economic sign always refers to the counterfactual expectation, not merely to the observed action.

Only Surprises Move Impact Prices

Anticipated policy is already absorbed; the surprise branch creates a price revision

A central-bank decision splits into an anticipated branch that leaves a price tile unchanged and a surprise branch that changes a sign-neutral yield curve
One decision, two information branches.
Anticipated branch
Action without news
When the decision equals the market’s conditional expectation, the announcement confirms the price already in place.
Unexpected branch
News without a predetermined sign
The revision can move the yield curve in either direction. Identification isolates the branch; the data determine the response.

Target and Path News Differ

A meeting can contain almost no target news and still deliver large path news

Current-target news
\[ S_t^{\mathrm{target}} = r_t^{*} - \mathbb E[r_t^{*}\mid\mathcal F_{t^-}] \]
The unexpected part of today’s target decision.
Future-path news
\[ S_{t,h}^{\mathrm{path}} = \mathbb E[r_{t+h}^{*}\mid\mathcal F_{t^+}] - \mathbb E[r_{t+h}^{*}\mid\mathcal F_{t^-}], \quad h>0 \]
The revision to a future policy rate.
Current-target and future-path news are separate coordinates of the same announcement.

One Announcement, Two Dimensions

The short lever moves the current target; the long lever reshapes the future path

A policy statement emits a short target lever and a long future-path lever, with orthogonal target and path directions below
Target and path are two empirical directions, not two signs of one scalar shock.
Target factor
Current decision
Loads directly on the current-month policy-rate surprise.
Path factor
Expected future stance
Moves the expected rate path while remaining orthogonal to the current-target loading.
Why one factor fails: the announcement can move either lever without moving the other.

Policy-Path Lab: Which Horizon Moves?

Switch between current-target news, future-path news, and a combined announcement

Before After
Announcement dimension
Current-target news shifts the near point and fades along the horizon.
Reading rule
Ask which horizon moved
A current-target surprise and a forward-guidance revision can occur together, separately, or with opposite signs.
This is why a policy-news vector is more informative than a single raw rate change.

Measure the Intrawindow Change

Measure the price immediately before and after the announcement

\[ \Delta_w x_t \equiv x_{t^+}-x_{t^-}, \qquad w=[t^-,t^+] \]
Old expectation in price
t− · before
t+ · after
New expectation in price
The narrow window compares the old price with the first price that embeds the announcement.

Long Yields Price a Path Plus a Term Premium

A long yield can move even when the current target does not

\[ i_t^{(n)} \approx \frac{1}{n}\sum_{j=0}^{n-1} \mathbb E[i_{t+j}^{(1)}\mid\mathcal F_t] + \operatorname{TP}_t^{(n)} \]
Expected short-rate path
Average expected stance
Current and expected future one-period rates over the maturity.
Term premium
Compensation for risk
Duration, inflation, liquidity, and other risks embedded in the long bond.
A distant path revision can move long yields without changing today’s target.

A Yield Surprise Has Three Additive Pieces

The accounting identity is clear; identification requires policy-news measures

\[ \Delta_w i_t^{(n)} \approx \underbrace{\frac{1}{n}\Delta_w i_t^{(1)}}_{\text{current short rate}} + \underbrace{\frac{1}{n}\sum_{j=1}^{n-1}\Delta_w\mathbb E[i_{t+j}^{(1)}\mid\mathcal F_t]}_{\text{expected future path}} + \underbrace{\Delta_w\operatorname{TP}_t^{(n)}}_{\text{term premium}} \]
Current rate
near-point revision
Future path
expected-rate revision
Term premium
risk compensation
Long yield
\(\Delta_w i_t^{(n)}\)
The yield response is an outcome; the surprise measure must explain which policy-news component moved it.

Path News Revises Expectations

Forward guidance changes conditional expectations of future short rates

\[ \Delta_w\mathbb E[i_{t+j}^{(1)}\mid\mathcal F_t] = \mathbb E[i_{t+j}^{(1)}\mid\mathcal F_{t^+}] - \mathbb E[i_{t+j}^{(1)}\mid\mathcal F_{t^-}] \]
Predictable action
No revision
If already priced, the action creates no path news.
Statement language
Path revision
Guidance can move distant expected short rates immediately.
Risk channel
Premium revision
A term-premium change can move the same long yield.
The long-yield response does not identify target news by itself.

Monthly Data Mix Policy and Macro News

The solution is a different regressor—not merely a different estimator

\[ \Delta y_t=\alpha+\beta\Delta r_t+\varepsilon_t \]
FailureWhy it entersConsequence
Reverse causalityThe bank reacts to financial conditions while markets react to the bank.\(\operatorname{Cov}(\Delta r_t,\varepsilon_t)\neq0\)
Omitted macro newsInflation, employment, output, and risk news move both the rate and the asset.\(\beta\) absorbs non-policy information.
AnticipationExpected policy is priced before the meeting.The observed action is not the news.
Low frequency combines reaction, information, and anticipation in one coefficient.

High Frequency Changes the Regressor

Use a policy-news vector extracted from futures prices inside a narrow event window

\[ \Delta_w y_t = \alpha+\theta^\prime S_t+\varepsilon_{t,w} \]
\[ \mathbb E[\varepsilon_{t,w}\mid S_t]=0 \]
Window
Short enough to exclude unrelated news; long enough for markets to price the announcement.
Shock
\(S_t\) is an expectation revision, not a raw policy action.
Caution: a market surprise can still combine target news, path news, and central-bank information about the economy.
Central Banking · Lecture 3
II
The target surprise from federal funds futures.
Part II
Kuttner (2001)

Separate Actions from News.

The expected component attenuates raw-action regressions; futures recover the unexpected current-target change.
Action = expected + surprise
Calendar-weighted futures
Yield responses reappear

Raw Target Changes Make Policy Look Weak

The puzzle is the regressor—not the disappearance of monetary-policy transmission

\[ \Delta R_{j,t}=\alpha_j+\beta_j\Delta r_t^{*}+\varepsilon_{j,t} \]
Measurement problem
Raw changes mix old and new information
The post-1989 coefficient is weaker because target changes became more predictable, not because yields stopped responding to news.
100 bp action3m2y10y
Cook–Hahn, 1974–7955≈10
Kuttner, 1989–200026.818.24.3
Cook and Hahn (1989); Kuttner (2001), Table 1.
If the action was anticipated, the announcement contains less new information than the observed rate change suggests.

Actions Split into Expected and Surprise

Only the unexpected component is new policy information at the announcement

\[ \Delta r_t^{*} = \underbrace{\Delta r_t^{e}}_{\text{anticipated}} + \underbrace{\Delta r_t^{u}}_{\text{surprise}} \]
Observed action
\(\Delta r_t^*\)
Expected part
already priced
Surprise part
new information
Asset response
\(\Delta R_t=\beta\Delta r_t^u+\varepsilon_t\)
The observed action is a sum; the impact response should load on the unexpected branch.

Expected Actions Attenuate the Estimate

Explore how the surprise share maps a true response into the raw-action estimate

\[ \operatorname*{plim}\widehat\beta_{\mathrm{raw}} = \beta \frac{\operatorname{Var}(\Delta r_t^u)} {\operatorname{Var}(\Delta r_t^u)+\operatorname{Var}(\Delta r_t^e)} \]
80
True \(\beta\)
40
Raw estimate
50%
Attenuation
Numerator
True policy surprises
The variation that can create an announcement response.
Denominator
All target changes
Surprise variation plus predictable variation.
Predictability is good communication but bad measurement when expected actions are treated as shocks.

The Variance Ratio Is the Surprise Share

Actual policy can vary substantially while announcement surprises remain small

\[ \frac{\operatorname{Var}(\Delta r_t^u)} {\operatorname{Var}(\Delta r_t^u)+\operatorname{Var}(\Delta r_t^e)} = \frac{\text{variation in surprises}}{\text{variation in actual target changes}} \]
MeetingActual \(\Delta r_t^*\)Expected \(\Delta r_t^e\)Surprise \(\Delta r_t^u\)
1+25+250
2+25+20+5
3000
4−50−45−5
A large observed action can be zero news; a small deviation from expectation can be the entire shock.

Monthly Futures Price an Average

The target surprise affects only the remaining \(D-d\) calendar days

Contract object
Average effective federal funds rate
Let \(D\) be days in the month and \(d\) the days already fixed when the announcement arrives.
\[ \omega_{\mathrm{repriced}}=\frac{D-d}{D} \]
Calendar exposure
\(d\) fixed days
\(D-d\) repriced days
The announcement changes the expected rate only for the red portion of the settlement month.
Monthly averaging mechanically dilutes the observed futures-rate change.

Before and After Share the Same Fixed Days

The historical part and the old target are common to both contract prices

\[ \begin{aligned} f^0_{s,t^-} &= \frac{d}{D}\bar r_{\le d} + \frac{D-d}{D} \left(r^{old}+\mathbb E[\Delta r_t^*\mid\mathcal F_{t^-}]\right) +\mu^0_{s,t^-},\\[0.45em] f^0_{s,t^+} &= \frac{d}{D}\bar r_{\le d} + \frac{D-d}{D} \left(r^{old}+\Delta r_t^*\right) +\mu^0_{s,t^+}. \end{aligned} \]
Before: expected action
The remaining-month block contains the action priced before the announcement.
After: realised action
The fixed days and old target are unchanged; the action is now known.
The fixed \(d\)-day average appears unchanged on both sides of the event.

Differencing Removes Fixed Days

The old target and historical average cancel

\[ \Delta_w f^0_{s,t} = \frac{D-d}{D} \left( \Delta r_t^* - \mathbb E[\Delta r_t^*\mid\mathcal F_{t^-}] \right) + \Delta_w\mu^0_{s,t} \]
Cancels
Historical average
The \(d\) already-realised days are identical before and after.
Cancels
Old target
The pre-event rate is common to both contract valuations.
Remains
Diluted surprise
Plus any intrawindow futures-premium change.
The futures-rate change isolates a revision; the calendar weight determines its scale.

Kuttner Rescales the Futures Movement

Undo the monthly-average attenuation to recover the unexpected current-target change

\[ \Delta_w\mu^0_{s,t}\approx0, \qquad \Delta r_t^u \equiv \Delta r_t^*-\mathbb E[\Delta r_t^*\mid\mathcal F_{t^-}] \]
\[ \boxed{ \mathrm{mp1}_t \equiv \Delta r_t^u = \frac{D}{D-d} \left(f^0_{s,t^+}-f^0_{s,t^-}\right) } \]
\(\mathrm{mp1}\) is the futures-implied unexpected current-target change.

The Scale Factor Reverses Monthly Averaging

Move the announcement through a 30-day month and observe the gross-up

15
Repriced days
2.00
Scale \(D/(D-d)\)
10.0
mp1 from a 5 bp move
\[ \mathrm{mp1} = \frac{30}{30-d}\times 5\text{ bp} \]
Original Kuttner window
Close to close
Previous-day futures close to announcement-day futures close.
Later implementations
Narrow intraday window
The economic object is unchanged; better data make the information window more local.
Near month-end, the same gross-up that recovers the signal also amplifies quote and premium noise.

Read the Implied Rate, Not the Futures Price

Reversing the price/rate sign reverses the economic interpretation

\[ f=100-\text{futures price} \]
Futures price falls
\(\Delta F<0\)
Implied rate rises
\(\Delta f>0\)
mp1 > 0
hawkish surprise
Implementation check: perform all surprise algebra in implied-rate units, then translate back to the quoted futures price if needed.

Month-End Scaling Amplifies Noise

When \(D-d\) is small, the gross-up becomes fragile

Mechanical issue
\(\frac{D}{D-d}\)
Explodes as the remaining-day count approaches zero.
Noise channel
Bid–ask and premium moves
The same factor multiplies quote error and intrawindow futures-premium changes.
Operational response
Switch contracts
Use the next-month contract when too few current-month days remain exposed.
\[ \Delta r_t^e=\Delta r_t^*-\Delta r_t^u \]
Implementation discipline protects the split between priced-in policy and new policy information.

Estimate Expected and Surprise Effects

The regression asks whether yields respond to the action or to the news inside it

\[ \Delta R_{j,t} = \alpha_j + \beta_{e,j}\Delta r_t^e + \beta_{u,j}\Delta r_t^u + \varepsilon_{j,t} \]
Expected coefficient
\(\beta_{e,j}\)
Response to a policy action already priced before the meeting.
Surprise coefficient
\(\beta_{u,j}\)
Basis-point yield response to a 100 bp unexpected tightening.
If markets are forward-looking, \(\beta_u\) should dominate \(\beta_e\).

A Rate Cut Can Still Be Hawkish News

Hawkish and dovish describe the action relative to the expected counterfactual

\[ \Delta r_t^u=-25-(-50)=+25\text{ bp} \]
Observed action
−25 bp
The Federal Reserve eases.
Unexpected component
+25 bp
Policy is 25 bp tighter than the market expected.
The surprise sign is a comparison with the priced counterfactual—not a description of the action in isolation.

The Yield Response Reappears in the Surprise

Native chart: basis-point yield response to a 100 bp target component

Raw action Surprise component
Two-year example
≈15 bp
A 25 bp surprise tightening implies \(0.25\times61.4\simeq15\) bp.
Result
Large across the curve
Surprise responses are 79.1, 61.4, 48.1, and 31.5 from 3 months to 10 years.
Kuttner (2001), Tables 1 and 3.

Target Surprises, 1990–2004

Target news varies sharply across meetings and is often small even when actions occur

Historical GSS target-factor series for FOMC announcements from 1990 through 2004
Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005); supplied course chart.
The econometric object is the announcement revision—not the size of the scheduled target move.

Target Surprises, 2005–2025

The modern sample preserves the same target-revision object around each FOMC announcement