Central Bank Communication Design and Public Attention

The paper asks a design question rather than a wording question. Central banks often focus on making communication clearer, but they also choose when to release different pieces of information. The Bank of England's 2015 Super Thursday reform is a natural case because it bundled the rate decision, minutes, forecast report, and press conference into one day.

The evidence shows a trade-off. A bundled full-release day receives more attention than a standard meeting day, and forecast occasions become more salient when they are co-located with the policy decision. But at the quarterly forecast-round level, removing a separate event also removes a separate opportunity for attention.

This is why the paper emphasises communication architecture. A stronger event can still produce less cumulative engagement if the calendar collapses two attention occasions into one. The result is directly connected to rational inattention: salience and frequency both matter.

Full-release days attract more attention than standard post-reform MPC meetings.

Research question

Does the architecture of central-bank communication events shape public attention, beyond the content of the message itself?

Why it matters

The paper matters for how central banks design communication calendars. Transparency is not only about releasing more information; it is also about sequencing information so that public attention is not accidentally compressed.

Data and method

Data

The paper uses Bank of England MPC event calendars and three revealed-attention measures: Twitter (X) policy-relevant users, Google Trends search attention, and Wikipedia page views. It compares pre-reform forecast rounds with post-reform full-release days.

Method

The empirical design compares event-level and quarterly forecast-round attention before and after the reform. It uses day-of-week-matched baselines, within-post full-release versus standard meeting comparisons, sensitivity checks, and multiple-testing correction.

Findings

1. Bundled days are salient

   Full-release days attract more attention than standard post-reform MPC meetings.

2. Forecast co-location raises attention

   Forecast occasions receive more attention after they are co-located with the rate decision on both Twitter and Google Trends.

3. Cumulative Twitter engagement falls

   At the quarterly forecast-round level, Twitter engagement is lower after the reform because one separate attention occasion is removed.

4. Content mix changes

   Bundling changes what users attend to, increasing the share of outlook-related discussion on full-release days.

The paper adds communication architecture to the central-bank communication literature. It shows that timing and bundling can change public attention even when the content domain is held fixed.

Figures and tables

Scope and limits

Digital traces measure revealed attention rather than comprehension, trust, or expectation formation. Cross-platform quarterly effects are heterogeneous, so the quarterly cumulative result should be read as channel-specific.

How to cite

@article{kansoy2026design,
  title   = {Central Bank Communication Design and Public Attention},
  author  = {Fatih Kansoy},
  journal = {Working paper},
  year    = {2026},
  url     = {https://fatih.ai/cbc.pdf}
}

Selected references

1. Bank of England. 2014. Bank of England announces measures to bolster transparency and accountability.
2. Blinder, A. S., Ehrmann, M., de Haan, J., and Jansen, D.-J. 2024. Central bank communication with the general public.
3. Blinder, A. S., Ehrmann, M., Fratzscher, M., De Haan, J., and Jansen, D.-J. 2008. Central bank communication and monetary policy.
4. Sims, C. A. 2003. Implications of rational inattention.
5. Reis, R. 2006. Inattentive consumers.